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ABSTRACT 
 
The UK has the most fully developed set of anti-European Union groups of any country, from 
national political parties through to local grassroots organisations and sectoral lobbies.  For 
most of these groups, the media plays a central role in their work, enabling them to reach 
audiences much greater than otherwise possible.  In this paper, the profile of such groups in 
the national print media will be considered, using frequency analysis.  This analysis 
demonstrates that coverage, while generally increasing over time, remains very uneven and 
episodic, both in time and between groups.  These findings are further backed up by study of 
discourse markers.  Differences between newspapers are discussed, with particular reference 
to the general political affiliation of the newspaper, as well as its position on European 
integration.  The paper concludes by considering the consequences of this pattern of media 
coverage for anti-EU groups at a time when the integration process would appear to be 
particularly susceptible to expressions of opposition. 
 
 
 
 2 
The Media Profile of Anti-EU Groups in the UK
1
 
 
 
 
Since the late 1980s there has been a proliferation in the UK of groups and organisations 
directed against the European Union (EU).  This was in large part driven by the rising 
political profile of the issue in the wake of Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech in 1988 
(Young 1998, Usherwood 2004), but also by the institutional structures of the British political 
system.  The use of a First-past-the-post electoral system and the subsequent development of 
a two party system in the House of Commons requires a high level of party management and 
cohesion, with the effect of pushing opposition outside the House and into the formation of 
single-issue groups (Aspinwall 2000, Usherwood 2002).  The consequences of this have been 
stark: in 1985 there were only 5 single-issue anti-EU groups in existence, all small in size and 
importance; by the end of 2004, there were some thirty groups, including political parties 
such as the UK Independence Party and high profile pressure groups such as the Bruges 
Group and Business for Sterling (see Usherwood 2005 for a brief overview). 
 
In this paper we will consider the extent to which this proliferation in number and volume of 
groups has been reflected in their media profile.  This is of intrinsic importance, since for the 
very large majority of these groups, the media represents their primary means of 
disseminating information and arguments, with a view to gaining some form of influence with 
the body politic.  The assumption behind this is that all groups share a common aim, namely 
to shape public policy.  In the particular case of anti-EU groups, their aim is to shape public 
policy either to reform or to reject the EU as it stands.  Because of the electoral system issue 
already mentioned, direct control is effectively off-limits, so groups have to resort to more 
indirect methods.  These range from influencing politicians (most commonly found when 
looking at factions within political parties), through using the media (as discussed here), to 
contacting members of the public directly (either through the internet or through face-to-face 
activities).  Of these, use of the media has been predominant, for the simple reason that 
national media outlets provide the most cost-effective means of reaching the general 
population.  Larger groups can afford to employ full-time media or communications officers 
to ensure a steady feed of material to the media, while smaller groups tend to concentrate their 
efforts on specific campaigns, given their more limited resources. 
                                                     
1 This paper was originally presented at the ECPR Third Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, 21 to 23 
September 2006, Istanbul, Turkey.  Thanks are due to comments from Roberta Guerrina, Mitchell Smith, 
Amy Verdun and two anonymous reviewers. 
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Even with such constraints of resourcing and manpower in place, it might be anticipated that 
the media profile of anti-EU groups in the UK has grown.  Notwithstanding the key role that 
the main political parties play in shaping political debate in the UK, even if individual groups 
cannot increase their profile beyond a certain point, then the increase in the number of groups 
over time would potentially add to the collective profile.  Likewise, we would expect the 
rising importance of the issue would draw media outlets to such groups for comment and 
content. 
 
However, such a pattern does not appear to be borne out by the data.  In this paper, we will 
perform some frequency analyses with respect to anti-EU groups in UK national daily 
newspapers between 1985 and 2004.  These show that while there is an upward trend in the 
volume of coverage, it remains a low level in comparison to the main political parties, and 
that it is highly episodic, indicating the ambivalent nature of coverage of the EU by media 
outlets and the failure of anti-EU groups to place themselves in a central position in the public 
discourse on European integration.  The paper thus forms a complement to the work by other 
authors on the relationship between the media and European integration, which has tended to 
focus on questions of framing and trans-national comparisons (e.g. Meyer, 2005; Trenz, 2004; 
Peter, Semetko & de Vreese, 2003; Semetko, de Vreese & Peter, 2000; Semetko & 
Valkenburg 2000). 
 
The paper is structured as follows.  After a brief note on methodology, there is a consideration 
of the general pattern of newspaper coverage over the study period.  This leads into 
discussions about the uneven coverage between groups, group life-cycle effects on coverage 
and variation on the basis of newspaper affiliation, before rounding up with some 
conclusions. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Before considering the results of the data analyses, it is necessary to unpack the methodology 
used.  This essentially concerns the choice of raw data, the time frame, and the means of 
analysis. 
 
The paper looks at those British groups with a primary focus on opposition to the European 
Union.  By this, we understand a primary focus to mean that a group is either purely about 
opposing the European Union and nothing else, or that it expresses positions on other issues, 
but work from a base-point of EU opposition.  Other groups have been excluded on the 
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grounds that it would be too complicated to isolate those references that relate to the groups’ 
EU opposition and that the sheer volume would drown out the other groups. 
 
The time frame of 1985-2004 is chosen to provide an opportunity to relate the volume of 
media references to the development of the European Union itself.  1985 marks the start of 
negotiations that led to the Single European Act (SEA), and the period contains the full 
negotiation and implementation cycles for the SEA, the Treaty on European Union, the 
Amsterdam Treaty and the Nice Treaty, as well as 4 European Parliament election cycles.  
These treaty and EP cycles are potentially important because they represent the points at 
which the European issue has enjoyed a relatively high media profile, and so we might expect 
that dissenting voices would find some expression at these times, if only as a result of media 
outlets wanting to provide some balance of coverage.  Likewise, the period also marks the 
time of greatest expansion of anti-EU groups, in both number and size. 
 
The use of national daily newspapers is largely a product of data availability: while it 
provides an incomplete picture of media coverage, it does represent the only practical means 
of collecting data.  Television, radio and the internet do not have the same searchable 
archiving systems as newspapers, the internet further suffering from its novelty.  In addition, 
some anti-EU groups have followed a policy of cultivating links with local newspapers, in 
order to avoid perceived distortion of their message.  Nonetheless, newspapers still form an 
important part of the media system in the UK, with 44% of people claiming to read a 
newspaper on a daily basis (Eurobarometer 64, 2005, p.271: the EU25 average is 36%).  
Moreover, the aim is not to provide a comprehensive and systematic account of media 
coverage, but merely an impression of overall trends.  The use of all national daily 
newspapers is designed to highlight different sectors of the news market, from high-end titles 
all the way through to the tabloids.  This range also allows us to make some observations on 
variations in coverage due to political affiliation. 
 
Data is taken from the Lexis-Nexis Professional archive (www.lexis-nexis.com).  This 
medium was chosen for ease of data collection, although in some cases, the back catalogue 
for particular newspapers does not extend back to the start of the time period in 
consideration.
2
  Searches were performed by use of group title (and alternative common 
abbreviations where appropriate (e.g. UKIP)), then manually counted (to remove duplicate 
entries), on the basis of references per group per month.  Any reference at all to a group is 
counted, without consideration of its location in an article or the subject of article as a whole: 
                                                     
2 As a case in point, there is no back archive available for the Financial Times, so it has been excluded. 
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any reference to a group is taken to imply a media profile: multiple references to a group 
within an article are not counted.  Some effect of varying month length is present, as is the 
impact of only having six days per week (since Sunday nationals were excluded), but these do 
not produce any significant effects.  Data for each newspaper were then collated, to produce a 
monthly figure for references per group per newspaper (since the number of newspapers 
varied over time).  Month-long units are used since they are large enough to give meaningful 
figures, but small enough to highlight relatively short-term fluctuations. 
 
In addition to the group references, references to ‘euroscepticism’ (and variants) were also 
collected.  Within the British discourse on European integration, euroscepticism has gained 
common currency as a signifier for those opposed to the EU.  Despite the reluctance of many 
people so described to accept the term (not to mention its academic indeterminacy) it is still 
useful as a measure of more general media interest in the subject of opposition to the EU. 
 
Naturally, in all of this it must be remembered that media coverage is not a passive matter.  
Generally speaking, anti-EU groups have to push their stories to media outlets if they are to 
have a chance of being covered.  Alternatively, certain groups may gain a reputation with the 
media and their opinions on various news items may be sought.  In both cases, the different 
actors have different agendas, which may or may not complement each other.  As discussed 
previously, media outlets have their own interests, and this might result in over- or under-
coverage of anti-EU groups and their activities, relative to other outlets (see Gleissner & de 
Vreese 2005, Morgan 1995).  While this is countered to a certain extent by using a variety of 
sources, it cannot be guaranteed that such effects will be eliminated. 
 
THE GENERAL PATTERN OF MEDIA COVERAGE 
 
Figure 1 shows the monthly references per newspaper for all UK groups with a primary focus 
on opposition to the European Union.  As a guide to reading this, a value of approximately 26 
would be equivalent to one reference per newspaper per day. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The corollary of this is that, generally speaking, anti-EU groups do not have a particularly 
high profile: at the end of the study period, the baseline average (excluding peaks) was about 
one mention per week per newspaper between 30 groups, or less than two mentions per year 
per group.  At the same time, coverage is also highly uneven: peaks usually only last one 
month and even at the end of the period there are months with little or no coverage.  Of those 
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peaks present, in only 5 months does the figure for references exceed 26 (i.e. one mention per 
day).  By way of contrast, the Conservative party records figures in excess of 100 on a regular 
basis. 
 
Thus at first glance, it would seem that anti-EU groups have made little and sporadic impact 
on the national print media.  At the same time, it must be recognised that newspaper coverage 
has generally increased over time.  Taking annualised totals it can be seen that there is a clear 
evolution in Figure 2.  Even when looking at falls in coverage year-on-year, the coverage 
during troughs increases over time: thus the 2002-3 trough has more coverage than the 1993 
trough, which in turn has more coverage than the 1987 flat-line. 
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
However, even with this aggregate progression of coverage, there are still only three years out 
of the 20 that produce as much coverage as the Conservative party gets in most months.  Thus 
it must be considered that the presence of anti-EU groups is still highly marginal.  This is 
borne out when one considers the figures on a per group basis, as in Figures 3 and 4.  These 
reveal that period of most generalised success for anti-EU groups came in the early 1990s, 
although this is partly a statistical artefact from the very small number of groups (a point 
which will be returned to later). 
 
FIGURES 3 & 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Having now looked at markers for groups, the focus now moves to a more general indicator 
of anti-EU discourse.  In order to do this, we have plotted usage of the world 
“Euroscepticism” and its variants in Figures 5 and 6.  The term chosen sprang out of the 
public debate on European integration and so can be taken as a marker of more generalised 
media interest in the subject.  However, it must be noted that many British groups have, in 
recent years, tended to reject the “eurosceptic” mantle, often preferring to be thought of as 
“eurorealists” instead (for example, the European Foundation describes itself as “the leading 
Eurorealist think tank” (http://www.e-f.org.uk/)).  Despite this, the media has been slow to 
adapt to this, preferring to use the more widely understood term, even if anti-EU groups do 
not feel it is entirely accurate. 
 
Once again, there is a high degree of variability between months, reflecting a lack of a 
systematic debate, although from the mid-1990s there is the development of an increased 
baseline of references.  Again, there are only two months when the references exceed 26 (i.e. 
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c. one reference per newspaper per day).  Indeed, the pattern presented is consistent with the 
overall positive correlation (0.562, 99% significance) between the two sets of media 
references, demonstrating not only the periodicity of coverage, but also that trends in group 
coverage have been mirrored in more general coverage.  
 
FIGURES 5& 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
The main point to be drawn from this section is not so much the growth of media coverage, 
but rather that the unevenness of coverage suggests that it is almost completely event-driven, 
rather than systematic: rather than occupying a fixed position within the national polity, anti-
EU groups only have a profile at certain points.  This is mostly seen when looking at the 
peaks in coverage.  The 1991 peak is composed of articles covering the Bruges Group’s 
criticism of the government’s European policy, the bulge in 1996-7 is almost completely 
made up of references to the Referendum Party, while the 1999 and 2004 peaks are related to 
the UK Independence Party’s electoral success at the European elections.  In short, in all 
cases, coverage is linked to specific events that do not provide for a consistent interest by the 
media.  Moreover, the majority of these events are not created by the anti-EU groups, in the 
sense that they are events which would happen regardless of what they decided to do: the 
biggest peaks are the result of one or more groups standing for election.  Only exceptionally 
do groups’ own positions come to the forefront (as with the Bruges Group in 1991). 
 
UNEVEN COVERAGE OF GROUPS 
 
Within the aggregate picture presented in the previous section, it is tempting to make some 
tentative conclusions regarding coverage.  However, to do so would be to miss some 
important differentiation within that data.  The first key differentiation comes from the fact 
that coverage is not evenly split between groups.  Instead there are a few groups that gain the 
majority of the coverage, with the rest getting occasional mentions now and again. 
 
To help isolate these peaks of coverage, we can use a simple measure, as seen in Table 1, 
which shows the percentage of total coverage falling to the two most referenced groups in that 
year.  With the sole exception of 1996 the two most referenced groups never receive less than 
50% of total coverage.  Looking at the period as a whole, there is a very marked concentration 
on specific groups, as seen in Figure 7: just 4 groups (UKIP, Referendum Party, Bruges 
Group and Business for Sterling) produce over 80% of all references, while 18 other groups 
produce less than 5%. 
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TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The reasons for such a concentration must be inferred, but given the pattern that the 
concentration takes, it seems reasonable to suggest three explanations that might play a role.  
The first lies with the groups themselves.  In most cases, anti-EU groups have worked with 
very limited resources, both financially and in terms of manpower.  Consequently, while they 
might be able to sustain activity that is covered by the media for a short period, they are 
usually constrained in the long-run (a point which will be discussed in the context of group 
life-cycles later on).  One upshot of this is that it is typically the larger and better financed 
groups that gain most coverage; UKIP, the Referendum Party, Business for Sterling.  
However, this is not always the case: the Bruges Group was very successful in the early 1990s 
despite a tiny office and staff, partly through its novelty and partly through its proximity to 
the Conservative Party; likewise, one of the largest anti-EU groups in the UK today, the 
Democracy Movement, has hardly any coverage at all, as a result of concentrating instead on 
grassroots activities with its members. 
 
FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
The second explanation comes from the media’s perspective: they require quick and repeated 
copy, which must in turn be of interest to readers.  Journalists build up relationships with 
certain individuals upon whom they rely for information and given that the general thrust of 
most anti-EU groups is the same (i.e. “we don’t like what the EU is doing”), there is no need 
to gather endless repetitions of this same message.  Indeed, some ignorance on the part of 
journalists of the existence is only to be expected, given the small size of many of them.  This 
lack of knowledge is also apparent in the continuing references to the Referendum Party, 
which was disbanded in 1997 after James Goldsmith’s death: in 2004 it was the second most 
referenced group!  More generally, the shift towards the personalisation of political coverage 
shifts the focus on to those individuals of notoriety or fame.  In this context, it is worth 
observing that much of UKIP’s huge amount of coverage in 2004 came not from its success 
in the European election, but rather the joining of the party by a former daytime talk-show 
host, Robert Kilroy-Silk, and his subsequent departure after failing to gain control of the 
leadership.  Another example would include Sir James Goldsmith’s role as leader of the 
Referendum Party in 1996-7. 
 
The third explanation is an environmental one and is partly modulated by the other two 
dimensions already mentioned.  Both anti-EU groups (because of their limited means) and the 
media (because of its nature) are largely reactive: they respond to political events, rather than 
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shaping them.  For much of the study period, this worked to the advantage of the groups: after 
Thatcher’s Bruges speech in 1988, the fragile pro-European consensus in Westminster was 
broken and the persistent in-fighting in the Conservative party on the issue since then has 
generated much media coverage.  Likewise, the rapid development of the European level of 
governance after the SEA provided repeated opportunity for comment and activity by anti-EU 
groups, from the TEU to the single currency to Eastern enlargement to the Constitutional 
Treaty. 
 
In the following sections, we will provide some limited data to illustrate the possible effects 
of each explanation. 
 
LIFE-CYCLE EFFECTS 
 
Typically speaking, anti-EU groups have small memberships and limited resources.  Groups 
such as the Referendum Party, with its access to Goldsmith’s sizeable fortune, or UKIP, with 
a string of significant backers and a membership in the order of 20,000, are exceptional.  As 
argued above, the upshot of this is that we might expect individual groups to be unable to 
maintain a long-term media profile.  This might be due to the difficulties of maintaining 
member’s full and active involvement over a long period, the difficulty of maintaining the 
media’s interest in the same core message (a particular problem for single-issue groups), or 
just that the financial resources are not there to support large-scale activity (often, though not 
always, a prerequisite for generating media interest). 
 
Whatever the underlying reasons, we would expect to see what we term a life-cycle effect in 
the coverage of the group.  In the first phase of coalescence and formation, the group is 
coming together: media coverage will be minimal, since there is little to say other than that 
the group is forming (in several cases, this has been triggered by a letter to a newspaper, 
either inviting people to join, or announcing the group’s foundation).  In the second phase of 
territory marking, the group implements its strategy and aims to make an impact on public 
debate and policy-makers, making full use of the resource base available: this is the period of 
maximum media coverage, for obvious reasons.  In the third phase, of stabilisation, the group 
settles down for the long-run, deploying resources as needed/available: here we expect media 
coverage to become more episodic, and generally follow a down-ward trend over time.  This 
notionally leads to a fourth phase of atrophy and disbanding, assuming the group loses 
members and resources and either formally or practically shuts down. 
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In order to see whether the media coverage bears out this model, Figures 8 and 9 shows 
averages per group at 6-monthly intervals after group foundation.  Figure 8 provides the data 
in terms of absolute references, while Figure 9 uses data expressed as a percentage of the first 
point for which data is available, in order to reduce size effects between groups.  Despite this, 
Figure 10 shows two lines, one for all groups and one for the average without UKIP or the 
Referendum Party.  The reason for this is simply that because of the sheer volume of 
references to those two groups (even with the use of relative data), they produce a very 
marked distortion of the overall averages, which might mask a more fundamental pattern. 
 
FIGURES 8 & 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
To a certain extent, the three-phase model is borne out. There are rising levels of media 
interest over the first 2-2.5 years after foundation, after which coverage falls off again, with 
occasional peaks of no more than 18 months in length.  The peak at 132 months is purely the 
result of the massive coverage for UKIP in 2004, while the high figures after 12 years (144 
months onwards) are a statistical artefact relating to the very small number of groups that 
have existed this long and which had hardly any coverage in the early years of their existence. 
 
At the same time, it is hard to be particularly categorical about the life-cycle dimension, if 
only because the bulk of the groups have not been in existence long enough for a full 
comparison to be made.  Also, the very low level of media coverage that most groups have 
received means that relatively small absolute changes in coverage can have a very marked 
impact.  But most importantly, the experience of the large groups, particularly UKIP, is a 
salutary one.  As can be seen in Figure 10, for the first six years after its foundation in 1993 it 
received hardly any coverage, before its first big breakthrough at the 1999 EP elections, 
which then fed through into a raised profile in advance of the 2001 general election, where it 
performed very poorly.  Despite this set-back, UKIP was able to maintain some presence 
through the early 2000s, particularly in the context of the debate on British membership of the 
euro, before its coup de theatre with the recruitment of Robert Kilroy-Silk to its ranks for the 
2004 EP elections, where it came third nationally.  The subsequent departure of Kilroy-Silk in 
unhappy circumstances maintained the media’s interest into the latter part of that year.  Thus 
it is possible to transcend the life-cycle model, but it remains exceptional. 
 
FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE 
 
UNEVEN COVERAGE BY NEWSPAPERS 
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Given the life-cycle variations for anti-EU groups, we might also consider the extent to which 
newspapers themselves affect coverage.  There has already been a discussion about the 
constraints on journalists imposing by the news cycle and by personal knowledge.  Such 
factors would appear to affect all newspapers, but it might be possible to observe some 
variation between different types of paper.  Here we will consider two such possible 
dimensions, newspaper format and political outlook. 
 
Typically speaking, tabloid newspapers contain much less content (in terms of words per 
issue) than broadsheets, partly as a result of shape constraints, partly as a result of a more 
encompassing agenda.  Thus it is no real surprise that tabloids have fewer references to both 
groups and euroscepticism over the study period (Figures 11 and 12).  In the period 2001-4, 
when data is available for all 9 papers, the average annual coverage by broadsheets was 
between 3 and 5 times that of the tabloids.  Moreover, in not a single case during this period 
does a tabloid have more coverage than a broadsheet.  However, it is worth noting that all the 
newspapers in this survey have correlations of 99% significance with each other on group 
references, so despite the division in volume, there is strong similarity in trend. 
 
FIGURES 11 & 12 ABOUT HERE 
 
Having noted this discrepancy in relation to format, we turn to political affiliation.  Here we 
might expect a number of effects.  In terms of identification of a newspaper with a political 
party, it might be that where this occurs, there is a desire to cast that party in the best light, so 
internal problems will be downplayed and trouble within other parties will be stressed.  Since 
both Labour and the Conservatives have internal cleavages on the European issue, and have 
both generated single-issue anti-EU groups within their ranks we are able to test this.  Figure 
13 shows coverage of groups with clear partisanship, split between newspapers with left-wing 
politics and those with right-wing ones, covering the period since March 2002, when all the 
groups were in operation.
3
  The results are ambivalent, not least because of the very small 
number of references involved.  Looking at references across the whole period, while the 
right-wing papers do have more references to Labour-aligned groups than the left-wing 
papers do (in line with the hypothesis), they also have more references to Conservative 
groups.  The simple explanation for this that the right-wing papers have more coverage of 
                                                     
3 The Labour groups are Trade Unions Against the Single Currency, Labour Euro-Safeguards Committee and 
Labour Against the Euro.  Conservative Groups are the European Foundation, Bruges Group, Conservatives 
Against a Federal Europe, Conservative European Research Group and Fresh Start Group.  The left-wing 
papers used are The Guardian and The Independent; those for the right are The Times and The Daily 
Telegraph.  The analysis has been limited to these papers since tabloids have few references. 
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anti-EU groups of all flavours than do the left-wing ones: unfortunately, because of the limits 
on the dataset, it is not possible to have a longer time-frame for analysis. 
 
FIGURE 13 ABOUT HERE 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS 
 
Having considered the group- and media-based explanations, we finally turn to environmental 
considerations.  The assumption here is that at times of heighten public interest in a particular 
issue, the media will respond by producing more coverage of that issue.  Certainly we might 
question the direction of causality, since the media does play some role in shaping peoples’ 
priorities, but as a proxy for this level of interest, it seems reasonable to look at public 
opinion.  It should be noted here that there is no direct examination of the role that the 
development of the EU itself plays in shaping the environment: we have noted above that 
there is some coincidence of peaks of coverage with specific events, such as elections and 
policy developments, but it is beyond the scope of this piece to address the question fully. 
 
The marker used to measure public opinion comes from the regular monthly surveys by 
Ipsos-MORI, which asks people “What do you see as other important issues facing Britain 
today?” (see www.ipsos-mori.com for a full dataset).  The percentage of people listing the EU 
or Europe is shown in Figure 14.  We can note here the general peaks of interest in 1992-3, at 
the time of the TEU, and again from 1996 to 2001, at the time of most debate about British 
euro membership. 
 
FIGURE 14 ABOUT HERE 
 
When we plot this against absolute group references per newspaper, as in Figure 15, we can 
see that there is a positive correlation (0.381, significant to 99%) thus suggesting that the 
environmental explanation might have some weak value.  At the same time, it remains 
unclear quite how the relationship works.  Since there is a degree of correlation between the 
group and discourse markers, and between both and the public opinion data, we cannot isolate 
a particular correlation.  It might be possible to isolate some clearer pattern with more fine-
grained data, but the Ipsos-MORI data only repeats on a monthly basis.  Introducing a one-
month time-lag does not help: while correlations remain at 99% significance, the Pearson 
correlations drop both for a one month lag on the group references and on the public opinion 
data.  Thus the question remains moot. 
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FIGURE 15 ABOUT HERE 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this paper has been to explore the extent to which anti-EU groups in the UK 
have managed to gain a foothold in the British national print media.  With the help of some 
frequency analyses of the period between 1985 and 2004 we have seen a very mixed pattern 
of results emerge.  On the one hand, it can be said that there has been a general increase in 
newspaper coverage of anti-EU groups and of anti-EU discourse more generally.  However, 
this increase has been uncertain and largely dependent on groups’ involvement in bigger 
events, notably elections: likewise, general coverage has been focused around particular 
events.  It is only rarely that groups have been able to push their own agendas.  As a result, 
substantial coverage is the exception, rather than the norm. 
 
Within this, there is much variation between groups.  The typical pattern has been for one or 
two groups to dominate coverage at any one time.  Since most groups have limited resources,  
they are prone to life-cycle effects, which mean that if they fail to make much impact in the 
first few years of their existence then they are very unlikely to be able to do so later on.  This 
has long-term consequences for the anti-EU movement as a whole, since the formation of new 
groups has slowed significantly since the end of the 1990s: despite the massive coverage 
afforded to UKIP in 2004, there is no indication that this is anything other than passing.  
Coupled to falling public interest/concern about the European Union as an issue more 
generally since 2000, it is tempting to suggest that in the future media coverage is more likely 
to fall than it is to rise. 
 
Despite the long period of sustained public interest and debate through the 1990s in the 
process of European integration, the groups which have effectively aimed to steer that interest 
and debate have failed to mark out a sizeable profile for themselves in the national print 
media, one of the main channels of political education in the country.  This is not to suggest 
that anti-EU rhetoric and discourse is absent, but rather that it is driven by the weight of the 
Conservative party, as a party of (potential) government, rather than by the wider anti-EU 
movement.  This failure suggests that while interest has been widespread, it has not been 
deep: most groups enjoy a brief period of growth and public interest, before slowly fading 
away.  Notwithstanding the fact that anti-EU groups engage in other activities that seek to 
promote their cause (such as direct lobbying of MPs or grassroots campaigning), the inability 
to maintain media profile cannot be seen as any kind of benefit to them.  The waning of the 
EU as an issue in recent years does not bode well for the groups: the smoothing over of 
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internal party divisions in both the Conservative and Labour parties (both tactically and 
strategically in the face of a maturing EU system) will similarly slow the flow of politicians 
willing to invest themselves in generating new anti-EU activity.  Indeed, the failure of the 
anti-EU movement to capitalise on the opportunities presented by the constitutionalisation 
process launched at Laeken in 2001 suggests that even such high profile events are not 
enough to change the structural position of these groups. 
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Table 1: Concentrations of Coverage, 1985-2004 
 
Year Number of 
Groups 
Percentage of Annual References Held by 2 
Largest Groups (% annual coverage) 
 
1985 5 
100 (Conservative European Reform Group 
(100)) 
1986 5 
100 (Conservative European Reform Group 
(100)) 
1987 5 - 
1988 5 
100 (Conservative European Reform Group 
(100)) 
1989 6 100 (Bruges Group (100)) 
1990 7 
99 (Bruges Group (89); Conservative European 
Reform Group (10)) 
1991 9 
98 (Bruges Group (86); Conservative European 
Reform Group (13)) 
1992 11 
84 (Conservative European Reform Group (53); 
Bruges Group (31)) 
1993 13 
56 (Anti-Federalist League (32); Bruges Group 
(24)) 
1994 15 60 (UKIP (37); Bruges Group (21)) 
1995 16 37 (Bruges Group (19); Fresh Start Group (19)) 
1996 17 85 (Referendum Party (77); UKIP (8)) 
1997 18 98 (Referendum Party (85); UKIP (13)) 
1998 24 
54 (Referendum Party (29); Business for 
Sterling (25)) 
1999 26 54 (UKIP (34); Business for Sterling (20)) 
2000 27 63 (UKIP (26); Business for Sterling (37)) 
2001 29 65 (UKIP (47); Business for Sterling (18)) 
2002 30 51 (UKIP (29); Business for Sterling (22)) 
2003 30 62 (UKIP (54); Referendum Party (9)) 
2004 30 97 (UKIP (94); Referendum Party (3)) 
  
 
